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ABSTRACT. This paper examines the possible Brexit 
scenarios and their impacts on the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU) with particular 
focus on Lithuania. The paper outlines the scientific 
discourse on the imminent modifications of the CAP after 
the Brexit along with changes in the EU budget. The paper 
was prepared during the beginning of Brexit negotiations, 
with withdrawal terms not being publicly disclosed. Thus, 
the most likely assumptions have been accepted in order to 
model the scenarios. The possible effects of Brexit on the 
agriculture of the small EU Member States are discussed 
taking the case of Lithuania as an example. The empirical 
analysis showed that, in the case of three different Brexit-
induced CAP modifications, Lithuanian agricultural sector 
may lose 1% to 20% of financial support under the CAP 
direct payment mechanism. The corresponding loss under 
these scenarios is quantified for agricultural sectors of all 
the EU Member States. 
JEL Classification:Q14, Q18 Keywords: Brexit, common agricultural policy, scenario 
modelling, Lithuania. 
Introduction 
Even though the United Kingdom has not been a founder of either the European Steel 
and Coal Community or the European Economic Community, for more than four decades it 
had been one of the main architects of unified European economic body – European Union – 
representing its second biggest economy, third most populous Member State (MS) and a solid 
net contributor to the EU budget of almost 8.5 billion GBP per year. The plausible exit of 
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such an important integral EU part as UK is one of the most significant events in both EU and 
UK political and economic life in a generation, having a potential to generate long lasting 
profound social, economic, political, security effects for the whole World for many years to 
come. This process have attracted a wide scientific attention from both, public policy, 
political science and economic researchers providing various estimates and predictions about 
impending economic effects both to UK and EU MS. A pig part of scientific focus was put on 
secondary impacts, such as changes in FDI flow trajectories (Dhingra et al., 2016, 
Kierzenkowski et al., 2016; Bruno et al., 2016), transformations of economic activities due to 
restrictions to immigration (Ebell & Warren, 2016; Owen & Walter, 2017; Sorace & Hobolt, 
2018), the changing income distribution and possible negative GINI corrections across 
income groups (Breinlich et al., 2016). Although existing researches pay a very little attention 
to the way in which the possible British exit from EU are likely to impact the EU MS 
agricultural sector – the biggest beneficiary of the EU budget through the Common 
Agricultural Policy. That is more important, the new small EU MS and its agri-business future 
after UK exit is being left in a shadow of a scientific dispute. This paper is addressed to fulfil 
this scientific vacuum, providing insights on possible CAP modifications after British 
withdrawal from EU and the effect of these modifications to small new EU MS agricultural 
sectors economic viability. 
This research features limitations related to the nature of the research object. 
Specifically, the paper was prepared during the beginning of Brexit negotiations, with 
withdrawal terms not being publicly disclosed. Thus, the most likely assumptions have been 
accepted in order to model the scenarios. 
1. Literature review 
1.1. Theoretical discussion on the effect of Brexit onto CAP 
After June 23, 2016, when British citizens voted for leaving European Union (process, 
called Brexit) deciding, that benefits of remaining in a unified economic body of 28 European 
Union member states became overshadowed by the negative consequences arising from four 
main liberties of EU: free passage of capital, goods, services and labour force (the latter 
becoming the biggest concern), the ongoing scientific debate, dealing with the reasonableness 
and consequences of this decision. Although the consequences of this decision will be felt all 
over the World (Sampson, 2017; Simionescu et al., 2017; Simionescu, 2018), the EU, as the 
biggest UK trading partner will be amongst the most severely affected, with possible negative 
correction of its GDP by 0,5%. It is clear that it is necessary to study the financial dependence 
of the countries and their financial markets inside the EU (Golab A., 2018). The first, who 
experienced the Brexit effect were financial institutions, facing up to ten times bigger capital 
requirements than during financial crisis of 2008-2009 (Carney, 2016). Other industries are to 
follow headed by agriculture (Dwyer, 2018).  
It is clear and obvious that the new EU Member States agricultural sectors will be of 
those, that will be most seriously affected by Brexit too. Lithuania is not an exemption. It is 
not only it is dependent on trade relations both within the European Union, that has no 
restrictions (Britain is one of the main export partners) and with the Commonwealth states 
(trading partners what will be harder to reach after Brexit), but it is also very dependant and is 
heavily subsidised and regulated under the present Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
(Hubbard et al., 2018). The impact of Brexit on the agricultural sector is conditioned by the 
degree of future trade competitiveness (i.e. relative tariffs) and trade openness between EU 
and Britain (Szczepaniak, 2018; Vitunskiene & Serva, 2015). It also depends on the status of 
the sub-sector concerned (agriculture, fishery, organic farming and etc.), but it is widely 
Artiom Volkov et al. 
 
 ISSN 2071-789X 
 INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY 
Economics & Sociology, Vol. 12, No.2, 2019 
330 
accepted, that it will negatively affect the conditions for agri-business in both UK and EU 
(McMahon, 2018). All the changes in the EU policy towards its agricultural sector will be 
reflected by the modifications of CAP, especially its financial support mechanism – direct 
payments system. 
The have been different opinions about CAP and its influence on Member States agri-
business sectors. Besides its pros, such as substantially increased farmers income (Kiss, 
2011), assured employment and viability of rural regions (Bartolini&Viaggi, 2013), cohesion 
and lowering GINI gap (Bachtler& Mendez, 2016), helped to eradicate land abandonment and 
etc., it also possess cons. Here it is of great importance to take into account the potential of 
land resources for agricultural enterprises (Kozhukhіvska et al, 2018; Reiff et al., 2016). In 
the case of the new member states of the EU it can lead to the problem of excessive 
purchasing agricultural property by foreigners (Lizińska et al, 2017). It is widely accepted, 
that the Common Agricultural Policy has had an overall negative environmental impact on 
environmental quality, fostering the intensification of agriculture, increasing water and air 
pollution and accelerating the decline in farmland birds (Gravey, 2016). Some Brexit 
proponents and green activists (Grant, 2018) have expected changes in CAP after Brexit 
addressed to abovementioned challenges, although the opinion prevails, that EU will have to 
improve land use in order to keep the living standards of its farmers at a comparable level to 
ones before Brexit (Swinbank, 2016; Helm, 2017). The environmental standards will even 
perish, as the UK has been a consistent champion of CAP reform and pioneered 
environmental measures that have been taken-up and widely applied, generating benefits 
across the EU (Gravey, 2016). 
In order to avoid negative impacts of Brexit onto new Member States agricultural 
sectors, a universal crisis management policy can be adopted. It is recommended to foster 
economic resilience in farm and other land management businesses by supporting versatile 
adaptation, increasing economic efficiency, business diversification, adding value and inter-
generational transfer, investing into long – term partnerships in the value chain, shortening it, 
enhancing SME‘s networks in agriculture. In spite of the aforementioned measures, budget 
allocated for the CAP is to shrink. Such a perspective is being discussed by a wide range of 
agricultural economics scholars, such as: Boulanger & Philippidis (2015); Matthews (2016); 
Nunez-Ferrer & Rinaldi (2016); Haas & Rubio (2017); Darvas & Wolff (2018); Bateman & 
Balmford (2018). There have been different estimates of decrease in the CAP budget 
following the Brexit. The amount estimated is 3 billion EUR – the sum that is being paid to 
CAP funding schemes by Britain, would disappear after Brexit. As this scenario is of a high 
probability, we have taken this into account modelling the impact of Brexit onto Lithuanian 
agricultural sector, naming this scenario CAP3. Indeed, the Brexit may affect the economic 
situation in EU in general (Busch & Matthes, 2016; Bergin et al., 2017; Whymann & 
Petrescu, 2017; Lawless & Morgenroth, 2019). It is being argued, that if Britain leaves the EU 
without a trade agreement and soft backstop, when a trade between EU and Britain would 
reduce (including agri-food products), arising from the imposition of tariffs on almost all 
products (also to key Lithuanian agricultural export good - wheat), it negatively affects all EU 
Member States economies, thus resulting in lower budget revenues of respective Member 
States and reduced CAP budget by 10 billion EUR (Boulanger &Philippidis, 2015; Darvas& 
Wolf, 2018). This scenario is considered as a less desirable and termed CAP10. 
There have also been suggestions that Brexit may produce economic benefits. 
Especially, in a soft Brexit scenario, where United Kingdom remains part of European 
Economic Area and enjoys the same common European market benefits as Norway (Dhingra 
et al., 2016). There is a possibility of changes to trading patterns, entrepreneurship and even 
encouraging new industries (Culkin & Simons, 2019). All these changes would contribute to 
economic activities in the EU that may compensate the Brexit consequences. It would allow 
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to allocate a slightly bigger part of the EU budget to CAP in order to keep direct payments on 
the same level. The possibility of the occurrence of this scenario is increased by the fact, that 
if the direct payments under the CAP would become lower, resulting a farming in less 
favourable areas becoming unprofitable. It may lead to situation when farmers exit their 
business in order to avoid losses, thus deepening the social problems in rural areas. All these 
possible scenarios will obviously have structural effects on the whole EU budget. 
1.2. Structural effect of Brexit on EU finances 
The impact of Brexit on EU finances is ambiguous. One of important challenges is the 
reorganization and redistribution of all Common property and commitments between the UK 
and the remaining EU members.  
The EU’s assets basically consist of financial assets (loans, cash), pre-financing 
amounts and properties and equipment. The EU’s main liabilities include pension rights, 
future payment obligations related to multi-annual projects, borrowing operations (e.g. 
through the the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism), provisions made to cover risks 
taken through loans and other financial instruments, and pending invoices (European 
Commission (2017a). As the documents of EU consolidated accountability shows, in 2015, 
the value of EU assets was 154 billion EUR while the liabilities amounted to 226 billion 
Euros. This means that the EU has more liabilities than assets (European Commission, 2016) 
and due to this reason, the UK will be required to pay the EU the so-called ”divorce bill”, the 
size of which will depend on the negotiation of Brexit. According to “Financial Times”, 
Brexit may cost the United Kingdom from 20 to 60 billion EUR (Financial Times, 2017).  
Since the government of the UK activated the article 50 until the end of March of 2017 
(European Council, 2017), the UK is supposed to leave the EU in the middle of 2019, which 
is before the end of Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF). However, withdrawal of the 
UK will not have one-off effects on the MS. Based on the state of progress of the negotiations 
with the UK under Article 50 of the Treaty on EU of the 2017 December 8th, following 
withdrawal from the EU, the UK will continue to participate in the EU programmes financed 
by the MFF for 2014-2020 until their closure, except for the programmes in which the UK did 
not participate before and those which can give rise to contingent liabilities the United 
Kingdom will not be liable for after withdrawal. Participation in EU programmes will require 
the UK and its beneficiaries to respect all relevant EU legal provisions 
(EuroposKomisija, 2017). 
Despite the fact that the EU avoided one-off effects up to the year 2020, Brexit will 
have a huge impact on the size, components and financing of MFF after 2020. These 
structural changes are less relevant to Lithuania today but are significant to the EU. Firstly, 
the EU budget will be redistributed considering the constant MFF financing deficit which can 
be equal to the sum of UK‘s net contribution or less, depending on the Brexit terms of 
agreement. Secondly, UK‘s withdrawal and accordingly, decrease in the EU gross national 
income (GNI) may mean that the EU budget will significantly decrease in absolute value if 
the Council of the EU maintains its stance to keep the EU budget at 1 % of EU GNI. Finally, 
Brexit will change the dynamics of budgetary negotiations in the EU Council. Termination of 
UK‘s net contributions will not only change the amounts of other member states contributions 
but can influence the internal dynamics within the coalition of net contributors (Haas, Rubio, 
2017). Therefore, when reorganizing the EU budget after Brexit, the EU member states will 
need to come up and agree on an option that would allow feel a minimum negative influence 
on the EU in general and all MS separately. 
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1.3. EU budget redistribution considering Brexit 
It is important to evaluate, how big the „Brexit deficit“ would be if the UK does not 
pay any national contributions to the EU budget or the EU does not receive any income from 
the UK Traditional Own Resources (TOR). Moreover, the EU would not have any 
commitments and expenses in the UK and the UK overpay refund corrections would 
automatically be eliminated along with the end of UK overpay refund mechanism. This way, 
based on the data of 2014-2016 MFF financial reports (European Commission, 2018), the EU 
would save some 7 billion EUR that are dedicated to the UK projects annually. On the other 
hand, 3 billion EUR lower budget income would be gathered from the TOR. In addition, the 
EU would lose 14 billion EUR in the form of direct UK contributions. In total, the EU would 
lose 10 billion EUR of annual budget income.  
Considering the data in MFF financial reports for 2014-2016 (European Commission, 
2018), Brexit would decrease the General National Income of the EU by approximately 
16.2% which makes it difficult to adapt the EU budget considering new reality. In this paper, 
the three main scenarios that could be implemented when making the decision for join budget 
on the EU level are analysed. These scenarios are based on the review of Brexit effect by 
Haas and Rubio (2017). 
The first scenario describes the Status Quo. In this case, the Status Quo means that if 
member states decide to maintain the same EU budget as it was until now, the income into the 
EU budget would have to be increased by 10 billion Euros. Obviously, following the Status 
Quo scenario, all member states would be required to significantly increase their 
contributions. However, the impact on net Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) balances 
would not be divided equally among MS.  
The second scenario – CAP3 – assumes the decrease in the EU expenses. Expense 
reduction may vary depending on which EU strategy would be chosen and which 
expenditures would be affected. In order to decide, which expenditures and program could 
face reduced financing, it is important to evaluate the consequences of the fact that the net 
„saved” sum should be no less than 10 billion EUR per year. Yet another choice is to combine 
the reduction in the EU expenses and increase in the MS contributions. In this case, it is 
assumed that a part of the contributions would be reduced on account of the CAP funding. As 
a compromise, the CAP funding would be reduced by 3 billion Euros each year. 
The third scenario assumes a decrease in the CAP expenses by 20%, i.e. scenario 
CAP10 implies the CAP funding would be reduced by 10 billion Euros.  
2. Methodological approach 
The modelling of possible Brexit impact in Lithuania is based on the abovementioned 
scenarios. Brexit‘s impact on CAP funding is evaluated in two stages of the research. The first 
stage analyses the impact of altered EU funding on the CAP net balances, i.e. a difference is 
calculated between the contributions to the EU CAP budget of that particular EU MS and that 
MS received CAP funding. In the second stage, it is predicted, how CAP funding changes if a 
new order of national contribution to the EU budget would be accepted based on 
abovementioned scenarios. 
The data for calculations are taken from the European Commission budget reports – 
the reports of 2014-2016 MFF (European Commission, 2018) by expense types and income 
types for separate member states (Table 1). 
In order to evaluate the impact of Brexit on CAP funding in Lithuania and the other 
MS following the Status Quo scenario, the data provided by EC on the EU budget fulfilment 
Artiom Volkov et al. 
 
 ISSN 2071-789X 
 INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY 
Economics & Sociology, Vol. 12, No.2, 2019 
333 
were applied (EU MFF reports).Those data were used to calculate the CAP net balances for 
all MS including Lithuania (the average values for 2014-2016 were used1). 
 
Table 1. MFF report part for 2014-2016, Lithuania, mill. EUR 
 
No. Article 2014 2015 2016 
2 SUSTAINABLE GROWTH: NATURAL RESOURCES 624.39 528,38 721,08 
2.0.1 
European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) - Market related expenditure and 
direct payments 
384.34 414,68 440,63 
2.0.10 
European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) - Market related expenditure and 
direct payments 
384.34 414,68 440,63 
 
Direct Aid 374.11 393,74 409,89 
 
Other 10.23 20,94 30,74 
2.0.2 European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) 232.39 106,90 276,17 
2.0.3 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF). Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations (RFMOs) and Sustainable Fisheries Agreements (SFAs) 
6.34 6,42 2,88 
2.0.31 European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) 6.34 6,42 2,88 
2.0.32 
Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFAs) and compulsory contributions 
to Regional Fisheries 
0.00 0,00 0,00 
2.0.4 Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (Life) 1.33 0,35 1,29 
2.0.DAG Decentralised agencies 0.00 0,03 0,01 
2.0.OTH Other actions and programme 0.00 0,00 0,00 
2.0.PPA Pilot projects and preparatory actions 0.00 0,00 0,10 
2.0.SPEC 
Actions financed under the prerogatives of the Commission and specific 
competences conferred to the Commission 





1885.9 877,2 1.477,4 
VAT-based own resource 40.3 42.9 45,3 
GNI-based own resource 253.6 247.2 242,6 
UK correction 26.3 25.6 28,2 
Retro-active implementation of the 2014 Own Resources Decision - NC - - 12,0 
Lump Sum Reduction Granted for DK, NL, AT & SE 0.0 0.0 2,8 
FSJ adjustment for Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 0.2 0.1 0,3 
TOTAL national contribution 320.4 315.8 331,3 
Traditional own resources (TOR) (80%) 64.3 73.9 77,5 
Agricultural duties (100%) 0.0 0.0 0,0 
Sugar levies (100%) 1.0 1.1 1,1 
Customs duties (100%) 84.7 97.7 95,8 
Retro-active implementation of the 2014 Own Resources Decision - TOR 0.0 0.0 0,0 
Amounts (20%) retained as TOR collection costs -21.5 -24.9 -19,4 
TOTAL own resources 384.7 389.7 408,8 
Gross National Income (GNI), EUR million* 35202.8 35750.7 37012,9 
General government expenditure 2014-2016 avg. 12983.8 
 
Source: prepared by the authors, based on Eurostat* and European Commission MFF reports for 2014-2016, 
(2017). 
 
It should be noted that MS net balances for particular expenses, such as CAP funding, 
are not provided in the MFF and the whole EU income goes to the joint budget. The balance 
of a particular expense category can be calculated by comparing the EU MS contributions to 
                                                 
1 The period of 2014-2016 was chosen due to new CAP programming period starting in 2014 (CAP 2014-2020) 
while the last accurate data available are those for year 2016. Therefore, to ensureminimal uncertainty when 
evaluating the influence on separate MS CAP balances, the average based on this period is used.  
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the EU budget and the EU funds that MS receives for a particular expense type in the MFF 
report. Based on the guidelines for calculating the net balance for a particular expense type 





  ,      (1) 
*CAP CAP CAP
it it itNB TC EX  ,     (2) 
* *CAP EU
it it tTC TC EX ,      (3) 
EU EU EU







 ,       (5) 
where t = 1, 2, …, T is the time period (we consider years 2014 to 2016), i is the index of the 
EU MS; CAP
itNB  – the netCAP balance for MS i  during year t; 
CAP
iNB  – the average CAP net 
balance for EU MS i during the period analysed; *CAPitTC  is the weighed net contribution to 
CAP of EU MS i in year t; CAP
itEX  – CAP expenses in year t of MS i; 
EU
tEX – the EU CAP 
expenses in year t which include European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), i. e. market 
related expenditure, direct payments and European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD); itTC  – the net national contribution of EU MS i in year t; 
EU
tTC  –sum of the net 
general national contributions in year t.We further normalize the results by the land area. In 
order to evaluate the CAP net balances per utilized agricultural area (UAA), 
CAP
iNB  is further 
divided by the corresponding UAA2 in MS i.  
In order to evaluate the CAP net balances per utilized agricultural area (UAA), 
CAP
iNB  
is further divided by the corresponding UAA2 in MS i.  
To evaluate the possible impact of Brexit on CAP net balances following the 3 
scenarios, several additional calculations were made following the recommendations of 
European Parliament (2017) and Matthews (2017a, 2017b) – UK rebate was eliminated and 
the net contributions of the UK were divided among member states taking their GNI into 
consideration. It allowed forecast the change of commitments of EU MS if the UK rebate3 and 
the so-called “rebate on rebate“4 impacting the contributions of Austria, Germany, 
Netherlands and Sweden is eliminated. These calculations are necessary as in the case when 
all MS increase their contributions proportionally, the contributionsof rebate MS would 
increase significantly more than these in others. Therefore, with the assumption that expenses 
in „new“(those that joined the EU after 2004) MS to the second CAP pillar are not included in 
the UK rebate, two measures can be calculated: (1) to what extend each MS have to contribute 
on rebate funding according to the existing rules and (2) how the burden would be distributed 
if GNI proportions were invoked instead. The difference between (1) and (2) can be both 
negative and positive, but in either occasion, the decision itself would allow to eliminate all 
UK rebates. In that case, the net contribution of the UK would be distributed among MS with 
                                                 
2Eurostat data for 2013 
3 The UK rebate (or UK correction) is a financial mechanism that reduces the United Kingdom's contribution to 
the EU budget in effect since 1985. It is a complex calculation which equates to approximately 66% of the UK's 
net contribution – the amount paid by the UK into the EU budget less EU expenditure in the UK (Council, 
1985). 
4 Rebate on the UK rebate (see Footnote 3) is applied to Austria, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden. Based on 
the averages of 2014-2016 these countries contributed up to 2 % of GNI-based own resource for the UK rebate 
while other EU MS contributed 10-12 % on average. 
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GNI taken into consideration as a limiting source of income to the EU budget. Considering all 
the discussed aspects, the changes of CAP funding based on scenarios are further presented. 
3. Conducting research and results 
Table 2 illustrates CAP net balances of the EU MS on 2014-2016 average. MS can be 
divided into 2 groups: the first (places 1 to 15) – positive CAP net balance group, i.e. 
beneficiaries and the second (places 16 to 28) – negative CAP net balance group (donor MS).  
 
Table 2.EU MS CAP net balance for 2014–2016 (average), Mill. EUR 
 
Nr. Member states (I group) Mill. EUR Nr. Member states (II group) Mill. EUR 
1.  Poland 3.123,9 16.  Cyprus  -3,1 
2.  Greece  2.095,4 17.  Denmark  -9,9 
3.  Romania  1.970,4 18.  Finland  -23,0 
4.  Spain  1.821,4 19.  Malta  -23,4 
5.  Hungary  1.336,9 20.  Luxembourg  -93,8 
6.  Bulgaria  837,5 21.  Austria  -118,7 
7.  Ireland  729,1 22.  Sweden  -659,6 
8.  Portugal  550,2 23.  France  -1.025,7 
9.  Czech Republic 526,3 24.  Belgium  -1.190,4 
10.  Lithuania  466,6 25.  Netherlands  -1.394,3 
11.  Slovakia  251,3 26.  Italy  -1.544,5 
12.  Latvia  164,5 27.  United Kingdom  - 2.944,6 
13.  Estonia  107,9 28.  Germany  - 5.060,6 
14.  Slovenia  77,0    
15.  Croatia  33,2    
 
Source: prepared by the authors based on European Parliament (2017) and Matthews, 2017a. 
 
Five biggest CAP net balance beneficiaries, which are Poland, Greece, Romania, 
Spain and Hungary, in absolute numbers, receive a total of 10 billion EUR that accounts 
positive net balance from 1.3 to 3.1 billion EUR for each. According to these calculations, 
Lithuania ranks10th place and falls into the group of beneficiaries with a positive CAP net 
balance of 466.6 million EUR. Amongst the biggest CAP netcontributors, i.e. donor MS with 
negative CAP net balances are Germany, UK and Italy. Their joint annual CAP net 
contribution CAP is 5.1, 2.9 and 1.5 billion EUR respectively. 
Based on the fact that the major part CAP payments are calculated per UAA ha, this 
aspect in particular is very important in the Brexit evaluations. Nevertheless CAP net balances 
may both be strongly positive or negative in their absolute value, they are able to change in 
comparison with UAA of MS and in turn regroup the position of MS. Thus, it is important to 
evaluate CAP net balances per 1 ha of UAA. With regard to the results obtained, the 
composition of two abovementioned groups actually has changed (Graph 1). 
According to Graph 1 the top 5 biggest beneficiaries based on CAP net balance per 1 
ha of UAA changed both in structure and ranking. Now it consists of Greece, Hungary, 
Poland, Bulgaria and Lithuania with 431.4 EUR/ha to 163.1 EUR/ha respectively. The result 
shows that Lithuania jumped from 10th place to 5th while Greece and Hungary outran 
Poland. Although in absolute values of CAP net balances Germany is in a very bad spot of 
being the main donor, compared to the relative UAA, it ends up in a pretty good situation 
compared to other donor MS and ranks the fifth place from the bottom. 
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Graph 1. EU MS CAP net balance per 1 ha of UAA 
 
Source: prepared by the authors base on European Parliament, 2017 and Matthews, 2017a 
*Average for 2014-2016. 
 
Based on these calculations, the worst situation would be that of Malta, Belgium and 
the Netherlands. Their negative CAP net balance per 1 ha of UAA would be from 2148.2 
EUR/ha to 754.7 EUR/ha respectively. 
3.1. Realization of scenario Status Quo  
If the same level of expenses of CAP would be attempted to maintain after Brexit, i. e. 
Status Quo scenario would prevail, 3 additional billion EUR would have to flow into CAP 
financial line of MFF every year. In that case, additional contributions from all MS would be 
made by using GNI resources. Such increase in contribution would lead to a decreased CAP 
netbalance for almost all MS. However, not all of EU MS budgets would be affected equally. 
As mentioned before, Austria, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden would lose the benefit 
of„rebate on UK rebate“. 
In general, a steeper increase in contributions expands the already existing imbalance 
between donors and beneficiaries of CAP net contribution. According to Status Quo scenario, 
negative Germany‘s CAP net balance would increase from 5.0 to 6.6 billion EUR (a change 
of 1.6 billion EUR), that of France – from 1025.7 to 1.2 billion EUR (a change of 0.2 billion 
EUR) (Table 3).  
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Table 3.Changes of the CAP net balances according to Status Quo scenario 
 






EUR  Member state Mill. EUR 
1.  Malta  -0,9 10.  Slovakia  -6,1 19. Belgium -36,2 
2.  Estonia  -1,8 11.  Hungary  -9,5 20. Poland -37,1 
3.  Latvia  -2,1 12.  Greece  -11,7 21. Spain -86,7 
4.  Cyprus  -2,1 13. 
 Czech 
Republic  -12,9 22. Italy -148,9 
5.  Lithuania  -3,2 14.  Romania  -13,6 23. Austria -156,5 
6.  Slovenia  -3,3 15. Portugal -14,8 24. France -187,9 
7.  Croatia  -3,5 16.  Ireland  -15,6 25. Sweden -221,5 
8.  Luxembourg -3,5 17.  Finland  -17,0 26. Netherlands -374,6 
9.  Bulgaria  -4,3 18.  Denmark  -22,0 27. Germany -1.547,5 
 
Source: prepared by the authors based on MFF reports (2014-2016) and European Parliament, 2017. 
 
At the same time, Poland‘s CAP net balance wouldn’t almost change and make up 3.1 
billion EUR (sum of budget in first place of Table 2 and 20th place of Table 3). In Lithuanian 
case, the CAP net balance would only decrease by 3.2 million EUR. In spite of that, it is 
important to emphasize that the calculated amounts only make up a small part of 
governmental sector expenses. Even in rebate MS, i.e. those that benefit from returns from 
UK rebate, the net balance change would amount to only 0.1% of all general government 





Graph 2. Changes in the CAP net balances per 1 UAA ha according to Status Quo scenario 
 
Source: prepared by the authors based on Eurostat, 2017, MFF reports (2014-2016)  
and European Parliament, 2017. 
 
Evaluating the impact of Brexit Status Quo scenario for CAP net balances change 
considering the dimension of utilized area, Netherlands would lose the most. CAP net balance 
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(see Table 3) to 13th with a loss of less than 7 EUR/ha. There is no significant changes in 
Lithuania with CAP net balance loss of 1.11 EUR/ha (ranking 4th place). 
3.2. Implementation of CAP3 scenario 
Reduction of EU expenses which is described in CAP3 scenario raises a higher burden 
of adaptation for the beneficiaries of positive CAP net balance. The 3 billion EUR which 
replace the Britain’s CAP net contribution would decrease CAP net balance of Poland and 
Greece by 213 and 131 million EUR respectively. Some net contribution donors such as 
Luxembourg and Belgium would see a small positive improvement of CAP net balance but 
would be affected negatively nonetheless. Germany’s CAP net balance would increase by 600 
million EUR more in comparison to the Status Quo scenario and CAP net balance change 
would be -964.3 million EUR while Lithuania‘s CAP net balance would decrease by almost 
30 million EUR (12th place) which is 10 times more than in the case of Status Quo (5th 
place). It is important to emphasize that in some cases the reduced CAP contribution would be 
higher than the loss of EU funding (Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Changes of the CAP net balances according to CAP3 scenario 
 
 
Member state Mill. EUR  
 
Member 
state Mill. EUR  
 
Member state Mill. EUR 
1.  Belgium  11,6   10.  Finland  -16,0   19.  Romania  -123,2   
2.  Luxembourg  -0,6   11.  Denmark  -16,1   20.  Austria  -128,6   
3.  Malta  -0,7   12.  Lithuania  -29,6   21.  Greece  -131,2   
4. 




-45,5   
22.  Sweden  -133,9   
5.  Croatia  -10,5   14.  Portugal  -45,5   23.  Netherlands  -190,2   
6.  Slovenia  -10,6   15.  Bulgaria  -48,2   24.  France  -192,9   
7.  Estonia  -10,6   16.  Ireland  -53,6   25.  Poland  -214,3   
8.  Latvia  -10,7   17.  Hungary  -80,4   26.  Spain  -219,6   
9.  Slovakia  -16,0   18.  Italy  -96,4   27.  Germany  -964,3   
 
Source: prepared by the authors based on MFF reports (2014-2016) and European Parliament, 2017. 
 
It can be seen that the higher the positive CAP net balance is in MS, the higher 
negative impact on net balances the Brexit can cause following this scenario.  
The situation changes if the mentioned loss is evaluated through the prism of CAP net 
balance per 1 UAA ha. According to CAP3 scenario the highest negative impact would be in 
the Netherlands but only half as big (-102.9 EUR/ha) as in Status Quo scenario (202.8 
EUR/ha). CAP3 scenario allows create conditions for all EU MS to suffer losses of no more 
than 100 EUR per 1 ha. Countries such as Belgium, France, Italy and Spain would lose even 
less than Lithuania with change of negative CAP net balance equal to10.3 EUR/ha (Graph 3). 
Although the loss of net financing of CAP in Lithuania is relatively low, the CAP net 
balance change is the second worst in comparison to share of all GGE and amounts to 0.23%. 
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Graph 3.Changes in the CAP net balances per 1 UAA ha according to CAP3 scenario. 
 
Source: prepared by the authors based on Eurostat, MFF reports (2014-2016), 2017  
and European Parliament, 2017. 
3.3. Implementation of CAP10 scenario 
Following CAP10 scenario, i.e. if the decrease in contributions of 10 billion EUR is 
reduced by CAP expenses, the impact on MS would be completely opposite in comparison to 
Status Quo scenario. According to CAP10 scenario, the MS that are big CAP net contributors 
would have the biggest benefit. For the majority of former UK rebate MS, i.e. Germany, 
Netherlands, Austria and Sweden, savings from reduced contributions would outweigh the 
distribution of EU funds. – Meanwhile, most net beneficiaries would pay a little less to the 
CAP budget, but would receive significantly lower payments. The CAP net balance of Poland 
would decrease by a fifth (663.2 million EUR) (Table 5). 
 
Table 5.Changes of the CAP net balances according to CAP10 scenario 
 
 
Member state Mill. EUR  
 
MS Mill. EUR 
 
MS Mill. EUR 
1.  Belgium  162,9   10.  Denmark  -9,3   19. Czech Rep. -120,2   
2.  Italy  128,9   11.  Slovenia  -18,9   20.  Portugal  -125,8   
3.  Netherlands  111,7   12.  Finland  -20,1   21.  Bulgaria  -168,9   
4.  Luxembourg  15,3   13.  Estonia  -23,3   22.  Ireland  -170,4   
5.  Malta   3,1   14.  Latvia  -35,8   23.  Hungary  -275,4   
6.  Cyprus  -2,2   15.  Slovakia  -56,3   24.  Romania  -394,7   
7.  Sweden  -5,5   16.  France  -76,3   25.  Greece  -426,3   
8.  Germany  -7,0   17.  Lithuania  -93,2   26.  Spain  -484,2   
9.  Croatia  -9,0   18.  Austria  -96,7   27.  Poland  -663,2   
 
Source: prepared by the authors based on MFF reports (2014-2016) and European Parliament, 2017. 
 
If this particular scenario would be implemented, CAP net balance in Lithuania would 
decrease by 93.2 million EUR, which is 90 million EUR less in comparison to Status Quo 
scenario. 
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In the discussed case, Lithuania would rank at 17th place which is 12 places lower 
compared to the Status Quo scenario. For MS such as Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and Malta, this scenario would be even beneficial than the current situation – 
without Brexit. 





Graph 4. Changes in the CAP net balances per 1 UAA ha according to CAP10 scenario 
 
Source: prepared by the authors based on Eurostat (2017), MFF reports (2014-2016)  
and European Parliament (2017). 
 
Evaluating the impact of CAP10 scenario on the CAP net balance change per 1 ha, 
Lithuania ranks one place lower – from 17th to 18th when compared to the absolute value of 
CAP net balance change. However, evaluation through this variable rather than absolute 
values is seems to be more attractive for Spain, which ranks at 14th place from 25th. On the 
other hand, this evaluation brings Slovenia to the 24th place from 11th, which means that not 
so strong loses in absolute values amounts to deep losses when compared to 1 ha of UAA. In 
addition, the most negative impact of this Brexit scenario would be in Bulgaria, Lithuania and 
Romania and according to the made calculations would amount to more than 0.7% of GGE 
(when calculating the ratio between the CAP net balance change and GGE) (Graph 4).  
All three scenarios show that Brexit may have a significant impact on many MS. 
However, evaluating the situation from the perspective of Lithuania, Status Quo scenario, i.e. 
increasing the contributions to the EU budget, would be the most beneficial (Table 6), 
calculations are based on the average of MFF for 2014-2016). In the mentioned case, losses 
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Table 6. The impact of the various Brexit scenarios on CAP net balances and received 
payments from the EU CAP as well as for the financing of the CAP pillar I and II in 
Lithuania, Mill. EUR 
 
Scenario 
CAP net balance 
change, Mill. 
EUR 
Change in received 
payments from EU 
CAP, Mill. EUR 
Change on financing 
of CAP I pillar, Mill. 
EUR 
Change on 
financing of CAP 
II pillar, Mill. 
EUR 
Status Quo -3,2 - - - 
CAP3 -29,6 -31,1 -20,8 -10,3 
CAP10 -93,2 -103,5 -69,2 -34,3 
 
Source: prepared by the authors based on Eurostat (2017), MFF reports (2014-2016) and European Parliament 
(2017). 
 
Taking into account the estimated impact of Brexit on the basis of the three different 
scenarios, based on the 2014-2016 MFF, the relative impact on the change the CAP net 
balance and financing payments from the EU CAP has been established (Table 7). 
 
Table 7. The impact of the various Brexit scenarios on the net balance of the CAP and the 
financing of payments from the EU CAP in Lithuania, %  
 
 
Scenario CAP net balance change, % Change in financing of payments from the EU CAP, % 
Status Quo  -0,68 - 
CAP3  -6,34 -5,04 
CAP10  -19,97 -16,74 
 
Source: prepared by the authors based on Eurostat (2017), MFF reports (2014-2016) and European Parliament 
(2017). 
 
The determined shares allow making assumptions about the possible impact on the 
financing of the main CAP measures – direct payments (DP) and Rural Development 
Programme (RDP) measures in Lithuania in financial years 2018-2020 (Table 8).  
 
Table 8. The impact of various Brexit scenarios on financingof DP and RDP measures in 










(Thou. EUR)  
By Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 and No 
1305/2013  492049 517028 282539 
Status Quo, thou. EUR  492049 517028 282539 
CAP3, thou. EUR 467264 490985 268307 
CAP10, thou. EUR 409679 430476 235241 
Difference between CAP3 and Status Quo -24785 -26043 -14232 
Difference between CAP10 and Status Quo -82370 -86552 -47298 
 
Source: prepared by the authors based on Eurostat (2017) and European Parliament (2017). 
 
Summing it up, it should be said that the reduction of EU budget due to Brexit would 
mean a decrease in support for Lithuanian CAP funding. Such decrease could make up as 
much as 16.7% of current budget.  
Artiom Volkov et al. 
 
 ISSN 2071-789X 
 INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY 
Economics & Sociology, Vol. 12, No.2, 2019 
342 
Conclusion 
This paper looked into the effects of the Brexit on the EU CAP. Specifically, the 
changes in the funding were analysed. The three scenarios of Brexit were discussed: 1) 
balancing of CAP financing, increasing the budget by 3 billion EUR (Status Quo scenario); 2) 
reduction of CAP financing by 3 billion EUR – the CAP3 scenario; and 3) reduction of CAP 
financing by 10 billion EUR – the CAP10 scenario. The scenarios were evaluated in two 
perspectives: by their effect on the CAP net balance change and the impact on the CAP net 
balance change per 1 UAA ha. 
The case of Lithuania was analysed along with the other MS. Assessing the impact of 
the scenarios on the financing of Lithuanian, it was determined that the least impact on 
Lithuania‘s CAP financing and CAP net balance change would have the scenario in which the 
contributions to the EU budget would be increased. Furthermore, it was shown that the 
reduction of contributions to CAP budget would lead to a negative impact on the CAP net 
balance in Lithuania: following the CAP3 scenario, the CAP net balance would decrease by 
6.34% while following CAP10 this figure would reach 19.97% while the received EU 
payments for financing CAP measures would decrease by 5.04 and 17.74% respectively. In 
the case of Status Quo scenario, EU CAP financing in Lithuania would not change and remain 
the same as set in the multiannual financial framework while the CAP net balance would 
decrease by only 0.68%. 
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